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Abstract
Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS), a game of cyclic dominance, is not
merely a popular children’s game but also a basic model system for
studying decision-making in non-cooperative strategic interactions.
Aimed at students of physics with no background in game theory, this
paper introduces the concepts of Nash equilibrium and evolutionar-
ily stable strategy, and reviews some recent theoretical and empirical
efforts on the non-equilibrium properties of the iterated RPS, includ-
ing collective cycling, conditional response patterns, and microscopic
mechanisms that facilitate cooperation. We also introduce several dy-
namical processes to illustrate the applications of RPS as a simplified
model of species competition in ecological systems and price cycling in
economic markets.
Keywords: cyclic dominance; non-cooperative game; decision mak-
ing; social cycling; conditional response; non-equilibrium
1 Introduction
Statistical mechanics aims at understanding collective behaviours of many-
particle systems from microscopic interactions [1]. If the system is a physical
one, each interaction among a subset of particles is associated with an energy,
and the total energy of the system is simply the sum of all these energies. The
system prefers to stay in microscopic configurations that minimize the total
energy, but it is constantly disturbed by the environment. This competition
between energy minimization and environmental perturbation leads to very
rich non-equilibrium dynamics and to many equilibrium phase transitions
in the system’s macroscopic property [1].
∗H.-J. Zhou, “The rock-paper-scissors game”, Contemporary Physics 57, 151–163
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Various collective behaviours, driven by strategic interactions among self-
ish agents, also emerge in game systems. As a new research field of statistical
mechanics, exploring and understanding the complex non-equilibrium prop-
erties of such competitive social systems became rather active in recent years
[2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. Yet statistical mechanical approaches to strategic in-
teractions, compared with physical systems, are facing two additional major
challenges.
In a game system, each interaction brings a payoff to every involved
agent, but a fundamental distinction with physical systems is that the pay-
offs for different agents of the same interaction are in general different. Such
differential payoffs cause all the conflicts and competitions in the system
[10]. Every agent seeks to maximize its own payoff, but the increase of one
agent’s payoff does not necessarily mean an increase of the sum of payoffs
of all the agents. Since the microscopic dynamics is not guided by the total
payoff, the conventional concept of equilibrium Boltzmann distribution of
the total payoff is not useful.
Another major challenge is that the microscopic mechanisms of decision-
making are quite unclear. In many game systems the agents have certain
degree of intelligence, and they make decisions in complicated ways taking
into account both the past experiences and the anticipated future events.
Furthermore, the microscopic parameters of decision-making may evolve in
time as a result of learning and adaptation.
Various games have been investigated in the literature, of which the
most widely discussed probably is the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, devised
by Albert Tucker about 60 years ago [11, 12]. This game is a paradigm
for studying cooperation of selfish agents and is the focus of thousands of
research papers [13, 14]. On the other hand the Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS)
game is a paradigm for studying competition caused by cyclic dominance [7],
yet it is much less discussed. In the present paper we review some aspects of
the RPS game for physics students, assuming the reader has no background
in game theory.
Being a popular game, the origin of RPS has been difficult to trace, but
there is some written evidence suggesting the Chinese played it already in
the Han Dynasty more than two thousand years ago. It is the simplest com-
petition system manifesting the ancient cyclic-dominance concept of oriental
taoism philosophy. This game brings fun to people of all ages and occasion-
ally serves as a fair mechanism to resolve choice conflicts among friends or
family members. There are three possible action choices: R (rock), P (pa-
per) and S (scissors). Action R is better than S, which in turn is better
than P , which in turn is better than R (Figure 1A). Because of this cyclic
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Figure 1: The Rock-Paper-Scissors game. (A) cyclic dominance among the
three actions R, P and S, where an arc s1 → s2 from action s1 to action s2
indicates that s2 beats s1. (B) The payoff matrix. Each matrix element is
the payoff of the row player X in action s ∈ {R,P, S} against the column
player Y in action s′ ∈ {R,P, S}. This figure is adapted from [15].
dominance none of the three actions is an absolute winning choice. In the
simplest case the game is played by two players and they compete simulta-
neously. For example if one player X chooses R while the other player Y
chooses S, then X is the winner.
The RPS game is not merely a game for fun, it actually has fundamental
importance as a basic model system for non-cooperative strategic interac-
tions. In theoretical studies, cyclic dominance is expressed more quantita-
tively by a payoff matrix. A frequently used one is shown in Figure 1B with
the parameter a being the reward of the winning action. For example, if
player X chooses action R and her opponent Y chooses S then the payoff
to X is a while that to Y is 0; if both players choose the same action (e.g.,
P versus P ) then a tie occurs and each player gets unit payoff. To ensure
the property of cyclic dominance we require a > 1. At the specific value
a = 2 the total payoff of the two players is the same no matter whether
the output is win-lose or tie. If a > 2, win-lose offers a higher total payoff
than tie, while the reverse is true for 1 < a < 2. In more general payoff
matrices the winning payoffs of the three different actions are different, then
the rotational symmetry among R, P , and S are broken (an example will
be given in Section 5).
In the following sections, we first introduce the concepts of Nash equi-
librium and evolutionarily stable strategy for the RPS game (Section 2),
and then discuss some recent theoretical and empirical efforts on the non-
equilibrium properties of iterated RPS, such as collective cycling, conditional
response patterns, and microscopic mechanisms that facilitate cooperation
(Sections 2 and 3). The applications of RPS in understanding species com-
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petition of ecological systems and price cycling of economic markets are
discussed in Sections 4 and 5. We conclude this review with a brief outlook
in Section 6.
2 Nash Equilibrium, Evolutionary Stability, and
Cooperation-Trap Strategies
There are two general theoretical frameworks to study strategic interac-
tions, classic game theory [16, 10] and evolutionary game theory [17, 18, 19].
Classic game theory is based on the assumption that the players can make
completely rational decisions, while evolutionary game theory tries to under-
stand game outcomes from the angle of evolution and adaptation. Consider
a simple scenario of two players X and Y repeating RPS for an indefinite
number of rounds. The payoff matrix is identical to that of Figure 1B,
with a being a constant. What shall we expect to observe concerning this
system’s long-time behaviour? Classic game theory gives a clear-cut answer
that it will reach a unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, while evolution-
ary game theory is more cautious, emphasizing that the actual microscopic
dynamics of decision-making is also a crucial factor.
2.1 Nash-equilibrium mixed strategy
Classic game theory assumes that the players all have unbounded rationality,
and the solution concept of Nash equilibrium (NE) plays a fundamental role
in this theoretical framework. In an iterated RPS between two such players,
if player X always chooses the same action (say R), the other player Y
naturally will always choose the winning action (P ) to maximize his own
payoff. If player X always chooses between two actions (say R and S),
player Y will also take advantage of such a regularity and beat X by always
choosing between actions R and P . To avoid being exploited, player X
should therefore adopt all the actions with positive probabilities. But how?
Since any regularity of choices might be detected and be exploited by
the rational (and intelligent) player Y, it is safe for player X to make an
action choice in each game round completely independent of her choices
in the previous rounds. Let us denote by wr, wp and ws the respective
probability of R, P and S being chosen by player X in one game round
(wr + wp + ws ≡ 1). The probability vector (wr, wp, ws) is referred to as a
mixed strategy in the game theoretical literature [10]. (If two of the action
probabilities are strictly zero, a mixed strategy reduces to a pure strategy.)
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Under a given mixed strategy of X, if player Y takes action R then his
expected payoff gr per game round is simply gr = wr + aws. Similarly the
expected payoffs gp and gs of P and S are gp = wp+awr and gs = ws+awp.
Notice that if player X chooses a particular mixed strategy (wr, wp, ws)
with
wr = wp = ws =
1
3
, (1)
the expected payoff of player Y is independent of his action and gr = gp =
gs = g
0 with
g0 =
1 + a
3
. (2)
In other words, it is impossible for Y to exploit X if the latter completely
randomize her action choices. Similarly if player Y sets his mixed strategy
to be (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), then the expected payoff of player X is equal to g0 and
it can not be further increased no matter how hard X tries to adjust her
mixed strategy. That is, the chance of player X to take advantage of Y is
also eliminated.
Equation (1) is a NE mixed strategy for the two-person iterated RPS.
In general, for a game with two or more action choices and involving two or
more players, we define an action probability vector of a player i as a NE
mixed strategy for this player if i is unable to increase its expected payoff
by changing to any another mixed strategy when all the other players keep
their own mixed strategy. If every player of the population is taking such
a mixed strategy the whole system is then said to be in a Nash equilibrium
[10].
It can be easily checked that the two-person iterated RPS has only a
unique NE at any a > 1 and, the probability vector (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) is the
only NE mixed strategy. We can extend the discussion to the scenario of
more than two players. At each game round every player competes with all
the other players or only with a single randomly chosen player. If we con-
sider only probability vectors (wr, wp, ws) that are strictly mixed (satisfying
wrwpws > 0), then it is relatively easy to prove that (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) is also
the unique NE strictly mixed strategy [20].
The strategy (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) is maximally random. When a system of
N players reaches the Nash equilibrium, all the 3N possible microscopic
configurations are equally likely to be observed, and the entropy of the sys-
tem achieves the global maximum value. Since every player makes decisions
independent of other players and of the previous decisions, the dynamical
property of the system is completely trivial.
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The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, although being unique for the it-
erated RPS game, may not necessarily be stable under small perturbations.
Since different action choices bring the same expected payoff g0 to a player
i, the strategy of this player may drift away from (1), which then will trigger
strategy adjustments from the other players. Facing these induced devia-
tions, if it is the best response for player i to deviate further away from
(1) then the Nash equilibrium is unstable. To investigate this type of local
stability one often needs to specify how individual players update their ac-
tion choices. A comprehensive review on population dynamics of strategic
interactions is presented in [21].
In the next subsection we introduce another type of stability criterion
which is independent of the particular microscopic competition dynamics.
2.2 Evolutionary stability
Stability of a mixed strategy can also be defined under the perspective of
mutation and selection [17, 18, 19]. Let us consider a population of N agents
interacting with a mixed strategy, say ~w. Suppose now a mutation occurs to
a subpopulation of n < N agents such that these n agents adopt a different
strategy (say ~w′). For this hybrid system, if the expected payoff g of an agent
in the unperturbed subpopulation is higher than the expected payoff g′ of an
agent in the mutated subpopulation, then the original strategy ~w is regarded
as an evolutionarily stable strategy, otherwise it is an evolutionarily unstable
strategy [22]. The concept of evolutionary stability is basic to evolutionary
game theory and is very useful for understanding biological evolution [18, 23].
For the iterated RPS game, let us assume the mutated strategy of n
members is (w′r, w′p, w′s) while the remaining (N−n) members adopt the NE
mixed strategy (wr, wp, ws) = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), see Figure 2. At each game
round every player competes with a randomly chosen member of the whole
population. The expected payoff for a player in the unperturbed subpopu-
lation is simply g = g0, while that of a player in the mutated subpopulation
is
g′ = g0 − (a− 2)n
2N
[
(w′r − 1/3)2 + (w′p − 1/3)2 + (w′s − 1/3)2
]
. (3)
If a > 2 we have g > g′, players adopting the NE strategy have a higher
expected payoff than players adopting the mutated strategy. By natural
selection the mutated subpopulation should shrink in size (n→ 0), making
the NE strategy evolutionarily stable. On the other hand, if 1 < a < 2 we
have g < g′, then the NE strategy is not evolutionarily stable and can not
6
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Figure 2: Evolutionarily stable strategy for the RPS game. (left) A pop-
ulation of N individuals adopting a mixed strategy (wr, wp, ws). (right)
A mutation occurs to n individuals, which form a subpopulation adopting
a mutated strategy (w′r, w′p, w′s). If the expected payoff of an individual
in the non-mutated subpopulation is higher than that of an individual in
the mutated subpopulation for any mutated strategy, the mixed strategy
(wr, wp, ws) is an evolutionarily stable strategy, otherwise it is evolutionar-
ily unstable.
persist under strategy mutations. In this latter parameter region the system
actually has no evolutionarily stable strategy.
Why is the strategy (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) evolutionarily stable when a > 2 but
unstable when a < 2? The reason lies in the interactions within the mutated
subpopulation. Consider two players adopting the mutated strategy. If they
meet, the probability of tie is
1
3
+
[
(w′r − 1/3)2 + (w′p − 1/3)2 + (w′s − 1/3)2
]
,
which is larger than 1/3. As the mean payoff a/2 of a win-lose output is less
than that of a tie output only for a < 2, the mutated strategy is beneficial
only in this parameter region.
In the above discussions, a mixed strategy (wr, wp, ws) is defined at the
level of individual players. We can also define a mixed strategy at the
population level. In this latter perspective each individual may hold a fixed
action (a pure strategy), then the mixed strategy describes the fractions
of individuals adopting the different actions, which is more appropriate for
studying strategic interactions in some biological systems. The same analysis
of evolutionary stability can be carried out at the population level to answer
the question of stable population composition under natural selection [18,
23].
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2.3 Cooperation-trap strategies
If an iterated RPS system is in the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, every
player stays in a safe position free of being exploited by the others. This
is of course fine in terms of risk avoidance, but on the other hand as all
players are interacting non-cooperatively they might miss the opportunity
of achieving higher accumulated payoffs. Is it possible to sustain high de-
gree of cooperation in this intrinsically non-cooperative game and beat the
Nash equilibrium? For the two-person iterated RPS, it was demonstrated
in [15] that there do exist simple strategies that are maximally fair and
also maximally profitable to both players. Such strategies are referred to as
cooperation-trap strategies [15] as they can induce an opponent player into
complete cooperation. Here we offer an implementation of cooperation-trap
strategies that improves the original protocol suggested in [15].
When the reward parameter a > 2 the mean payoff to a player from a
win-lose is higher than the payoff of a tie. An intelligent and rational player
(say X) therefore has incentive to search for a strategy that maximizes the
chance of wins while minimizes the chance of ties. The recipe of a simple
cooperation-trap strategy goes as follow:
1. By default, player X acts in the cooperation mode. In this default
mode, X avoids using one of the three actions (say P ) and adopts the
remaining two actions (R and S) with equal probability 1/2 in each
game round. If player Y cooperatively responds to X by adopting
action P , then both players get an equal expected payoff a/2 per round,
which is a fair result and is higher than the value g0 of the NE mixed
strategy.
2. However if player Y exploits the cooperation mode of X by adopting
action R, which returns an even higher expected payoff (1+a)/2 to Y,
player X switches to the punish mode in the next m game rounds. In
this punish mode X employs the NE mixed strategy and adopts actions
R, P and S with equal probability 1/3. The expected payoff per round
is then reduced to g0 for both players. Player X is forgivable and she
switches back to the default cooperation mode after each punish mode
of length m.
If player X employs this cooperation-trap strategy, it is beneficial for player
Y to abandon action S; furthermore if the punish mode duration m is equal
to or larger than a minimum value m∗ ≡ d3/(a− 2)e, then it is optimal for
Y to fix his action to P in every game round. When a > 5 we have m∗ =
8
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Figure 3: The cooperation-trap strategy. (A) The minimal memory length
m∗ as a function of the payoff parameter a. m∗ ∝ |a−2|−1 in the vicinity of
a = 2, and m∗ ≡ 1 for a > 5. (B) If player X employs the cooperation-trap
strategy of memory length m = 6 while player Y employs a mixed strategy
(1−wp, wp, 0), the expected payoffs per game round for X (g(x)) and Y (g(y))
as compared to g0 of the Nash-equilibrium mixed strategy (a = 5.0).
1, suggesting that a minimum punish level is enough to sustain complete
cooperation (Figure 3A).
When 1 < a < 2 the mean payoff of a win-lose is less than the tie
payoff. In this region the default cooperation mode of player X is modified to
promote tie rather than win-lose. By default player X adopts the same action
(say P ) in every game round as long as player Y responds also with action P .
If Y exploits X by adopting action S in one game round, X switches to the
punish mode in the next m rounds and then switches back to the cooperation
mode. It is also easy to verify that if m ≥ m∗ ≡ d3(a− 1)/(2−a)e complete
cooperation between the two players can be achieved (Figure 3A).
To achieve high degree of cooperation we need a proactive player X to ini-
tialize cooperation. Does the opponent player Y also need to be sufficiently
intelligent to figure out the intention of X? This may not be necessary.
Let us consider a totally myopic player Y who employs a mixed strategy
(wr, wp, ws) and changes this strategy in time to maximize his gain. Since
action R is better than S when facing a player X adopting the cooperation-
trap strategy, ws will evolve to zero and then the mixed strategy of Y be-
comes (1 − wp, wp, 0). Player Y’s expected payoff g(y) per game round is
compared with the corresponding g(x) of player X and the NE payoff g0 in
Figure 3B for the case of a = 5 and m = 6. We notice that g(y) is a strictly
increasing function of wp, indicating that complete cooperation (wp = 1) is
the only fixed point of any gradual learning process of player Y.
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Figure 3B also demonstrates that the expected payoff of player X is less
than that of Y unless complete cooperation is reached. Indeed g(x) is even
less than the NE payoff g0 if player Y is not sufficiently cooperative. Player
X may overcome such a drawback by further refinements of the cooperation-
trap strategy. This issue and empirical evaluations of the cooperation-trap
strategies will be further studied in a systematic way.
3 Conditional Response Patterns in Human Sub-
jects
A convenient assumption of the preceding section is that players of infinite
rationality (who must have excellent random-number generators!) make de-
cisions based on certain mixed strategy (wr, wp, ws) and modify this strategy
according to feedback information from the iterated RPS. However such an
assumption is often not realistic in competition processes involving human
subjects. A person may not be well conscious of a mixed strategy, rather
the decision-making is heuristic and is easily disturbed by environmental and
psychological factors (e.g., automatic imitation of opponent’s actions [24]).
Even if the human brain may have the capacity of implementing a mixed
strategy, generating a random sequence of actions following this strategy is
itself very demanding (the human brain performs poorly in randomization
tasks [25, 26]).
How do people choose actions in the iterated RPS? As a first step to an-
swer this difficult question, empirical investigations were carried out in the
last few years by several research teams [27, 28, 29, 20]. Two of these exper-
iments [27, 29] employed the all-to-all protocol with every person playing
simultaneously against all the other players in the population, while [28, 20]
employed the more traditional random pairwise-matching protocol, with ev-
ery person only competing with another single player. Here we focus on
the results of the latter as the experimental setting mimics decision-making
under uncertainty.
A total number of 360 university students participated in the experiment
of Wang and Xu [28, 20]. These human subjects form 60 groups with each
group (population) containing six people. As shown in Figure 4A, at each
game round t = 1, 2, . . . , 300, the six players of each population are randomly
paired and they play once with their pair opponent (which might be different
in different rounds) under the payoff rule of Figure 1B, and then every player
receives feedback information about her/his own payoff in this round, her/his
accumulated payoff, and the opponent’s action in this round.
10
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Figure 4: Iterated RPS played by N = 6 human subjects. (A) The players
at each game round form N/2 random pairs and they play the game once
with the pair opponent only. The winner of each pair gets payoff a and the
loser 0, while the payoff for a tie is 1. (B) Each social state (nr, np, ns) is a
point of the triangle confined by nr + np + ns = N and nrnpns ≥ 0, where
nr denotes the total number of players choosing action R (similarly for np
and ns). The social state for the example of (A) is (2, 2, 2) and is marked by
the star symbol at the triangle’s center. As the game is repeated it leaves
a trajectory in the social-state triangle. For the shown trajectory segment,
the rotation angles (with respect to the centroid) of the three social-state
transitions are, respectively, θ = +60◦, θ = 0◦ and θ = −120◦. This figure
is adapted from [20].
In the experiment each population plays with a fixed reward parameter
a whose value ranging from a = 1.1 to a = 100. The empirical results
demonstrated that the precise value of a does not affect the qualitative
dynamical behaviour of this finite-population system [20, 30].
3.1 Individual inertia effect and collective cycling
During the 300-round iteration, each player leaves an action sequence (s1,
s2, . . ., s300) with st ∈ {R,P, S} being the action at the t-th round. We
then get the preference vector of this player to the three actions, (fr, fp, fs),
where fr is simply the fraction of rounds the action being R (similarly for
fp and fs, and fr + fp + fs ≡ 1). We find that, consistent with the Nash
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Figure 5: Statistical regularity of the iterated RPS with payoff parameter
a = 2.0 played by 72 human subjects (divided into twelve groups of size
N = 6). (A) The mean action shifting probability of a player (and the
standard error of this mean) conditional on the current action. Given the
current action being R, the probability of making a clockwise shift (R→ S),
of repeating action R, of making a counter-clockwise shift (R → P ) are
denoted as r−, r0 and r+, respectively. The probabilities p−, p0, p+ and
s−, s0, s+ are defined similarly. (B) The accumulated cycle numbers C1,t in
the first t game rounds as obtained for the twelve populations. (C) The mean
action shifting probability of a player (and the standard error of this mean)
conditional on the result of the current play being win (W), tie (T) or lose
(L). Given the current result being W, the probability of making a clockwise
action shift, of repeating the same action, of making a counter-clockwise shift
are denoted as W−, W0 and W+, respectively. The probabilities T−, T0, T+
and L−, L0, L+ are defined similarly. This figure is adapted from [20].
equilibrium theory, the vectors (fr, fp, fs) of the players are close to the
mixed strategy (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). For example fr = 0.36±0.07, fp = 0.32±0.07
and fs = 0.32± 0.06 at a = 2.0 (mean and standard deviation, obtained by
averaging over 72 subjects) [20]. This observation is of course most natural
given the rotational symmetry among the three actions.
The Nash equilibrium theory also predicts the choices of a player at two
consecutive game rounds are completely independent of each other. But this
is not what actually happened in the game. Instead there is considerable
degree of temporal correlation within each action sequence. Especially, as
demonstrated in Figure 5A, a player in each round is more likely to repeat
the action of the previous round than to shift action either in the counter-
clockwise (R→ P or P → S or S → R) direction or in the clockwise (R→ S
or P → R or S → P ) direction. This inertia effect is strongest at a = 1.1,
it weakens slightly with the increase of a and is still very significant even
at a = 100 [20]. On the other hand, if a player does make a change, this
change is symmetric in the sense that the probability of shifting action in
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the counter-clockwise direction is almost the same as that of shifting in the
clockwise direction.
Although individual action changes from any action do not have di-
rectional preference, the empirical data reveal persistent counter-clockwise
cycling in the collective behaviour of the population. The population’s col-
lective state at each game round t can be described by the vector (nr, np, ns)
with nr being the total number of players adopting action R (similarly for
np and ns). The evolution of this so-called social state with t then draws
a trajectory in the social-state plane (Figure 4B), which is highly stochas-
tic. To detect directional motions that signify deviation from equilibrium,
a rotational angle θ is assigned to each social-state transition [20]. If the
transition is associated with a counter-clockwise rotation around the cen-
troid of the social-state plane, then θ is positive; if it is associated with a
clockwise rotation around the centroid, then θ is negative; in all the other
cases θ = 0 (Figure 4B). The net number of turns C1,t a trajectory cycles
around the centroid of the social-state plane from the first to the t-th game
round can then be obtained by adding up the rotation angles. As illus-
trated in Figure 5B for a = 2.0, the accumulated cycle number C1,t has a
linearly increasing trend with t, revealing persistent collective cycling along
the R → P → S → R direction. The mean cycling frequency is ν ≈ +0.03
(one counter-clockwise cycle in about 35 game rounds), and this value does
not change significantly with the payoff parameter a [20].
3.2 The conditional-response mechanism
The existence of weak but persistent collective cycling (Figure 5B) is ap-
parently conflicting with the absence of directionality in the action shift
behaviour of individual players (Figure 5A). Why a seemingly symmetric
dynamics at the level of individual players results in asymmetric motion at
the level of the whole population?
This apparent contradiction has been resolved in [20] by the key obser-
vation that players have different degrees of willingness to make a change,
depending on whether the previous play was a win, a tie, or a lose. Consider
the tendencies W0, T0 and L0 of a person to choose the same action in two
consecutive rounds if the earlier round is a win (W), a tie (T) or a lose (L),
respectively. The empirical data reveal W0 > T0 > L0, that is, the tendency
of repeating an action increases with the payoff of the earlier round (Fig-
ure 5C). Such a microscopic pattern is qualitatively similar to the ‘win-stay
lose-shift’ strategy of playing the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, whose
effectiveness has been confirmed by theoretical calculations [31, 32] and ex-
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tensive computer simulations [33, 34]. The tendencies (W−, T− and L−) of
shifting action in the clockwise direction and the tendencies (W+, T+ and
L+) of shifting in the counter-clockwise direction also depend considerably
on the output of the previous round [20].
Inspired by these empirical conditional response patterns, a simple model
of decision-making was proposed in [20] to understand the interactions in the
iterated RPS. This model assumes the action shifting probabilities in each
game round depend only on the game output in the previous round. For ex-
ample if a player wins a play, then in the next round she/he has probability
W0 to stick to the same action, probability W− to shift action in the clock-
wise direction, and probability W+ to shift action in the counter-clockwise
direction. This conditional-response microscopic rule is characterized by six
independent parameters (W−,W+, T−, T+, L−, L+) which can be empirically
fixed and it completely ignores all the possible higher-order complications
in the decision process. Yet very encouragingly, this simple model quanti-
tatively reproduce all the major experimental results, including the cycling
frequencies and inertia effects measured in the 60 different populations (for
more details see [20]).
It is really interesting and unexpected that complicated decision-making
processes of human subjects are statistically described by such a simple
conditional-response mechanism. However we should also point out that
the conditional-response model is at present only a phenomenological model.
A missing link of basic significance is how the six independent conditional
response parameters evolve in time as a result of learning. It could be that
the conditional-response mechanism is just the result of certain lower-level
learning dynamics. These questions need to be further studied from the
neurobiology side [35, 36].
A counter-intuitive theoretical prediction of the conditional response
model is that social-state cycling does not require microscopic asymmetry in
conditional responses: it persists even if W− = W+, T− = T+ and L− = L+
provided that W0, T0 and L0 are not all equal to each other [20]. This
prediction has been verified by computer simulations, confirming that social
cycling is indeed an emergent phenomenon.
3.3 Discussion on the effect of population size N
Under the random pairwise-matching protocol, each player has probabil-
ity 1/(N − 1) of encountering the same opponent in two consecutive game
rounds. This probability decreases quickly with population size N , and con-
sequently the action choices of different players are less and less correlated
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as N increases. Since active decision-making is a costly mental process, as
the action correlation decreases with N , the incentive for a player to change
action should be weaker and weaker, especially if the player wins a previ-
ous round. Therefore we expect that the players will be less active in a
larger population and the inertia effect of decision-making will be stronger;
furthermore the win-stay probability W0 will also increase with N .
The N = 2 iterated RPS is special. As both players know about the op-
ponent’s action history, it is a complete-information system. To avoid being
the loser in this two-person game, both players should be very active and
make their action choices most difficult to predict. We therefore anticipate
that, (i) the inertia effect of individual players will be most weak, and (ii)
the conditional response probabilities will only weakly deviate from 1/3 and
the players may not prefer to repeat a winning action.
The effect of population size will be systematically explored by labora-
tory experiments. These empirical studies may inspire the construction of
refined learning models for the iterated RPS.
4 Rock-Paper-Scissors in Species Competition
Cyclic dominance is a ubiquitous phenomenon in ecological systems. For
example the European honeybees invaded the local honeybees after being
introduced to Japan but they were unprepared for the attacks from Japanese
hornets, while the Japanese honeybees have developed a collective thermal
defense mechanism against the hornets as a result of coevolutionary adapta-
tion [37]. Another more quantitative example is the color polymorphism of
male side-blotched lizards [38]. Field measurements revealed the frequencies
of the three types of cyclicly dominant male lizards oscillate with a period
of approximately six years and with a mutual phase shift of about two years
[38]. Ecologists believe cyclic dominance to be a key factor contributing
to ecosystem complexity, and they take the RPS game as a basic model of
species competition and coexistence [39, 40, 7]. In this section we briefly
review two simple microscopic ecological processes, the collision dynamics
and the replicator dynamics.
4.1 The collision dynamics
We may consider an ecological system formed by three different species R,
P , and S. The total number of individuals in the system is a fixed integer,
N . Among these individuals Nρr belong to species R, Nρp to species P ,
and the remaining Nρs to species S (ρr+ρp+ρs ≡ 1). At each time interval
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δt = 2/N there is a competition between a randomly chosen pair of neigh-
bouring individuals. If this competition is between two individuals of the
same species, then both individuals survive. If it is between an individual of
species R and one of species P , then with probability wp←r the R-individual
is displaced by an offspring of the P -individual. The parameter wp←r quan-
tifies the dominance degree of the P species to the R species. Similarly the
other two dominance degrees are denoted as wr←s and ws←p, respectively.
Notice that the expansion of one species is associated with the shrink of
another species (constant-sum game).
Such a simple collision model and its various extensions have been in-
vestigated by many authors (see, e.g., reviews [39, 5, 7]). In the case of a
well-mixed population each individual has equal chance of encountering any
another one, then for N → ∞ the species frequencies ρr(t), ρp(t), ρs(t) as
functions of time t are governed by [41, 42]
dρr
dt
= ρrρswr←s − ρrρpwp←r , (4a)
dρp
dt
= ρpρrwp←r − ρpρsws←p , (4b)
dρs
dt
= ρsρpws←p − ρsρrwr←s . (4c)
Equation (4), as a simple theory of cyclic dominance among three species,
can be regarded as an extension of the celibrated Lotka-Volterra equation
on the nonlinear predator-prey interactions between two species [43]. This
evolution equation has a fixed-point solution of
ρ∗r =
ws←p
wr←s + ws←p + wp←r
, (5a)
ρ∗p =
wr←s
wr←s + ws←p + wp←r
, (5b)
ρ∗s =
wp←r
wr←s + ws←p + wp←r
. (5c)
Notice that lowering the dominance degree wr←s of species R has an en-
hancing effect on its fixed-point frequency ρ∗r . This is because decreasing
wr←s has the indirect consequence of suppressing the growth of species P
which preys on species R.
If the initial frequencies of the three species deviate from the fixed
point (ρ∗r , ρ∗p, ρ∗s), the system will not evolve into it but will move around
it along a periodic orbit, see Figure 6. Equation (4) has infinitely many
such limiting-cycle solutions, each of which is characterized by an invari-
ant C ≡ (ρr/ρ∗r)ρ
∗
r (ρp/ρ
∗
p)
ρ∗p(ρs/ρ
∗
s)
ρ∗s [42, 41]. C = 1 at the fixed point
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Figure 6: The collision model of species competition at dominance param-
eters wr←s = 0.2, ws←p = 0.5, wp←r = 0.3. Solid lines are theoretical results
for population size N = ∞, dashed lines are the results obtained by a sin-
gle simulation of a population of N = 1000 individuals. (left) Trajectory
of the population’s state
(
ρr(t), ρp(t), ρs(t)
)
starting from the initial state
(1/3, 1/3, 1/3). The population-state triangle is understood in the same way
as Figure 4B. (right) Evolution of ρr(t) with time.
(ρ∗r , ρ∗p, ρ∗s), and it decreases continuously to zero as the distance of the lim-
iting cycle to the fixed point increases.
Since the population state evolves along a limiting cycle, such an infinite
ecosystem is only marginally stable. This has a very significant consequence
for a finite ecosystem, namely species extinction is an unavoidable fate.
Figure 6 illustrates a single evolutionary trajectory of a population with
N = 1000 individuals. Starting from an initial state ρr = ρp = ρs = 1/3,
the population state initially follows the periodic orbit, it then deviates more
and more from this orbit due to the intrinsic stochasticity of the collision pro-
cess. At the later stage the oscillatory magnitudes of the species frequencies
become more and more pronounced and eventually only one species remains
in the population. The final surviving species depends on the whole evolu-
tion process, but the species with the lowest value of dominance degree has
the highest chance of survival (“survival of the weakest” [42]).
This prediction of species extinction does not agree with empirical ob-
servations. Different species do coexist in various real-world ecosystems
containing only a finite number of individuals. There have been a lot of the-
oretical and experimental studies on this issue. A central aspect of real-world
systems is its spatial structure [44]. Different species cluster into different
local regions in a two- or three-dimensional space, and the interactions be-
tween different species occur only at the boundaries between these regions.
Simulation results and theoretical computations reveal that all the species
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in such a spatial system have a high probability of survival even after an in-
finite evolution time. The species form very interesting entangled patterns,
each region of a species is a spiral shape, and the boundaries of the regions
move in time [45, 46].
In real-world ecosystems, individual animals also move actively in space.
Increased mobility entails increased interactions with the other species and
makes the population be more mixed. An interesting theoretical observation
of [47] is that there is a sharp ‘phase transition’ of biodiversity in the Rock-
Paper-Scissors ecosystem: if the species mobility exceeds certain critical
value, the probability of species coexistence drops from ≈ 1 to ≈ 0 for a
sufficiently large system. Therefore the RPS ecosystem can tolerate certain
degree of species mobility but not too much.
4.2 The replicator dynamics
In many ecological systems, species conflict is not caused by the direct
predator-prey interactions but is the result of competing for the same re-
sources. For example, different strains of budding yeast cells may grow and
reproduce in the same environment. One mother cell divides into two daugh-
ter cells after its body size exceeds certain critical value, so the number of
yeast cells proliferates in an exponential manner under good nutrient con-
ditions. If one strain of yeast cells has a higher growth rate than another
strain, it will have a higher reproduction rate and its population size will
then increase exponentially faster than that of the rival strain [45, 48].
The interactions among three types of yeast cells were studied in the
experimental system of [45], and cyclic dominance in growth-rate advantage
was observed. Similar cyclic dominance phenomena also exist in other engi-
neered or naturally-occurring microbial ecosystems. For such an ecosystem,
the reproduction rate of a particular species then depends strongly on the
relative abundances of all the species. As a simple model we may again
consider an ecosystem formed by three species R, P , and S. Let us assume
that the reproduction rate gr, gp and gs of the three species depend linearly
on the species frequencies ρr, ρp and ρs:
gr = c0 − ρp + (a− 1)ρs , (6a)
gp = c0 − ρs + (a− 1)ρr , (6b)
gs = c0 − ρr + (a− 1)ρp , (6c)
where the parameter c0 denotes the null reproduction rate when species
competition is absent (for simplicity we assume it is the same for all the three
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Figure 7: The replicator model of species competition. When a > 2
(top), the population state (ρr, ρp, ρs) evolves towards the steady state
(1/3, 1/3, 1/3). When a = 2 (middle), the population state moves along
a periodic orbit. When a < 2 (bottom), the population state mores towards
the boundary of the state space and cycles in a non-periodical manner. The
left panel shows three representative population state evolution trajectories
(for a = 4.0, 2.0 and 1.9, respectively) starting from the initial population
state ρr = 0.9, ρp = ρs = 0.05, while the right panel shows the fraction ρr(t)
as a function of time t.
species), which in general depends on the total number of individuals in the
population. Notice that increasing the frequency ρp of the P species has a
negative effect on the reproduction rate of the R species, while increasing
ρs of the S species has a positive effect on gr when a > 1.
The expected number nr(t) of R-individuals evolves with time t accord-
ing to dnr(t)/dt = nr(t)gr and similarly for the other two values np(t) and
ns(t). The total population size N(t) ≡ nr(t) + np(t) + ns(t) then evolves
according to dN(t)/dt = N(t)g, with the mean reproduction rate being
g = ρrgr +ρpgp+ρsgs. If g(t) is always positive the total population will di-
verge with time. Since ρr(t) ≡ nr(t)/N(t) and similarly for ρp(t) and ρs(t),
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we have
dρr
dt
= ρr
[
gr − g
]
, (7a)
dρp
dt
= ρp
[
gp − g
]
, (7b)
dρs
dt
= ρs
[
gs − g
]
. (7c)
Equation (7) is independent of the null reproduction rate c0. Such an evo-
lution dynamics is usually referred to as the replicator dynamics [22, 19].
The deterministic dynamics (7) is easy to solve numerically. This equa-
tion has a fixed-point solution of ρr = ρp = ρs = 1/3. If a > 2, the
population state (ρr, ρp, ρs) evolves towards the fixed point (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)
starting from any initial condition satisfying ρrρpρs > 0, therefore this fixed
point is a globally stable state and coexistence of all the three species is
stable towards perturbations (Figure 7, top panel). At a = 2, however, the
evolution converges to a limiting cycle (middle panel of Figure 7). Similar
to the collision model of the preceding subsection, the ecosystem is then
only marginally stable and will eventually goes to species extinction. To re-
main biodiversity we need to consider again the spatial structure of species
competition.
When 1 < a < 2, the evolution does not converge to a fixed point,
nor to a limiting cycle, but keep cycling with longer and longer period.
The last phenomenon of non-periodic oscillation was first discussed in [49].
As shown in the bottom right panel of Figure 7, the frequency of each
species (say ρr) jumps back and forth between the nearly extinct state (ρr ≈
0) and the overwhelmingly occupied state (ρr ≈ 1). The jumps between
these two situations occur very quickly while the residing time in each state
become longer and longer. The reason that a species can recover from nearly
extinction to predominance is mainly due to the assumption of offspring’s
exponential proliferation. In the actual situation of a finite population, two
of the species will be extinct inevitably.
The replicator dynamics has been extensively used in game theoretical
studies [4]. It is a quantitative model system to discuss evolutionarily stable
strategies [17, 18]. This dynamics can also be interpreted as a simple model
of social learning through imitation [19].
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5 Rock-Paper-Scissors in Market Price Competi-
tion
It is common to observe that different shops in a market sell the same item
at different prices, and furthermore, the price of each shop is not a constant
but changes non-monotonically in time (see, e.g., [50, 51]). Edgeworth first
predicted the existence of persistent price cycles [52], arguing that under
strong competition shops will lower their prices in small steps to attract
more customers, but if the price hits a bottom level they will suddenly lift
price to a much higher level. The RPS game has been used in the theoretical
economics field to qualitatively describe price dynamics [53].
Suppose a simplified situation that each day there are N new lazy buyers
and N new diligent buyers looking for a particular item. A lazy buyer
enters into the first shop he found and buys the item, while a diligent buyer
examines all the shops in the market and buys the item at the shop offering
the lowest price. Let us further assume that there are only two shops selling
this item and these two shops can choose to sell at three different price levels,
the high price h, the medium price m, and the low price l.
Initially both shops may sell the item at the high price h, and the ex-
pected profit or payoff for each shop is Nh. If one shop (say X) now lowers
the price to m, its expected payoff changes to 3N2 m, which is higher than
Nh if m > 23h, but the expected payoff for the other shop (Y) is reduced
to N2 h. If l >
2
3m, the best response of shop Y is to shift price from h to
the low value l, which will lead to an expected payoff of 3N2 l for itself and a
reduced value N2 m for shop X. But if h > 2l, shop X will again respond by
shifting to the high price h which increases its expected payoff to N2 h, ...,
causing persistent price oscillations [54]. The above analysis demonstrates
that in the parameter range of 23h < m <
3
2 l and 2l < h <
9
4 l, there is the
cyclic-dominance of the medium price m beating the high price h, the low
price l beating the medium price m, and the high price h beating the low
price l.
If this simple market system stays in the mixed-strategy Nash equilib-
rium, the mixed strategy (w0l , w
0
m, w
0
h) for each shop to choose the low,
middle, and high price is
w0l =
mh− 3l(h−m)
ml + (m− l)h , w
0
m =
(m+ l)h− 3ml
ml + (m− l)h , w
0
h =
ml − (m− l)h
ml + (m− l)h .
(8)
Notice that w0l > w
0
m > w
0
h, meaning that each shop should choose the
low price with the highest probability and the high price with the lowest
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Figure 8: The noisy best-response model of price competition with response
parameter β. The two shops can choose among the low price l = 1, the
medium price m = 1.45 and the high price h = 2.1. (left) The steady-
state probabilities wl, wm and wh of choosing the three prices, which are
quite different from the corresponding values (w0l ≈ 0.457, w0m ≈ 0.332,
w0h ≈ 0.211) of the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. (middle) The expected
payoff per game round g as compared to the NE value g0. The maximal value
g ≈ 1.402 is reached at β ≈ 1.3. (right) The mean cycling frequency of the
system’s social state.
probability. For the representative parameter set l = 1, m = 1.45 and
h = 2.1, we have ρ0l ≈ 0.457, ρ0m ≈ 0.332 and ρ0h ≈ 0.211. The expected
payoff per day (normalized by N) is g0 = mhl/[ml + (m − l)h], which is
always larger than (6/5)l but less than (4/3)l.
But in reality the prices of different shops are highly entangled [50, 51].
For our two-shop toy model, a simple microscopic process to mimic cor-
related decision-making is the noisy best-response dynamics with a single
parameter β [55]. Knowing the price s
(x)
t−1 of shop X at day (t− 1) but un-
certain of its price at the next day t, shop Y chooses its price s
(y)
t ∈ {l,m, h}
at day t according to the conditional probability distribution
P (s
(y)
t |s(x)t−1) =
eβg(s
(y)
t |s(x)t−1)
eβg(l|s
(x)
t−1) + eβg(m|s
(x)
t−1) + eβg(h|s
(x)
t−1)
, (9)
where g(s(y)|s(x)) is shop Y’s payoff (normalized by N) in state s(y) while
the other shop X chooses price s(x), e.g., g(l|l) = l, g(m|l) = m/2, and
g(h|l) = h/2.
The steady-state marginal probabilities (wl, wm, and wh) of choosing
the three prices are easy to compute if both shops are governed by the
same stochastic dynamics (9). This steady-state distribution is very different
from the NE mixed strategy (see Figure 8, left). If β = 0, there is no
selection, wl = wm = wh = 1/3, and the expected payoff per day is g =
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(2h + 3m + 4l)/9. As β increases the expected payoff changes in a non-
monotonic way, and there is an optimal value of β at which the expected
payoff reaches the global maximum value much higher than the NE value
g0 (Figure 8, middle).
We can study the collective behaviour of this two-shop toy model follow-
ing the same method of Section 3.1. When β > 0 there is persistent cycling
in the system (Figure 8, right), which is consistent with the Edgeworth price
cycle [53, 52]. The cycling frequency is an increasing function of β (positive
cycling direction is high price → middle price → low price → high price).
Real-world markets are of course much more complex than the model
discussed here. The key points we want to emphasize are (i) cyclic domi-
nance among different price levels do occur in real markets [50, 51], and (ii)
it is much more beneficial to make intuition-guided decisions rather than
to follow the Nash-equilibrium mixed strategy in price competition. The
second point is indeed closely related to the debated issue of rationality (the
reader may consult [56] for more discussions).
6 Outlook
The Rock-Paper-Scissors game is a simple game that helps improving our un-
derstanding on many complex competition issues (species divergence, price
cycling, human decision-making, rationality and cooperation and so on).
This game is the simplest model system for studying the non-equilibrium
statistical mechanics of non-cooperative strategic interactions, and it can
serve as a starting point to enter into the interdisciplinary field between
statistical physics and game theory.
In this brief review we have left untouched the issue of possible phase
transitions. If the Rock-Paper-Scissors game is played on an infinite lattice
or a complex network, are there competition-driven critical phenomena and
how to quantitatively describe these behaviours? At present, how players
adjust their decision-making parameters is still quite unclear and is largely
ignored in theoretical investigations. A lot of empirical and theoretical ef-
forts are needed in these directions.
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